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SUMMARY 
Low-cost level crossings are often criticized as being unsafe. Does a SIL (safety integrity level) rating make 
the railway crossing any safer? This paper discusses how a supporting argument might be made for low-
cost level crossing warning devices with lower levels of safety integrity and issues such as risk tolerability 
and derivation of tolerable hazard rates for system-level hazards. As part of the design of such systems 
according to fail-safe principles, the paper considers the assumptions around the pre-defined safe states of 
existing warning devices and how human factors issues around such states can give rise to additional 
hazards.  
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Level crossings are a significant safety concern for 
Australian railways. Approximately 30% of rail 
related fatalities occurred at level crossings as a 
result of collisions between motor vehicles and 
trains for the five year period from 2001 to 2010 
[1]. 
According to the railway level crossing stocktake 
conducted by RISSB in 2009 [2], there are 23,532 
level crossings in Australia comprised of 8,838 
public, 12,508 private, 566 maintenance and 1,659 
pedestrian crossings (minus 39 that were counted 
twice).  
Of these, approximately 33% of public, 0.5% of 
private, 1% of maintenance and 49% of pedestrian 
level crossings have a form of active protection. 
The remaining 79% of level crossings have 
passive protection and are typically found in low-
population regional areas of Australia. Private and 
maintenance passive crossings however, are not 
restricted to low-population areas. While 
individually the risk at these crossings is 
insignificant, collectively they contribute to a 
significant proportion of the risk for railway 
operators.  
In the ten-year period from 2000 to 2009, there 
were 695 collisions between trains and road 
vehicles at level crossings in Australia resulting in 
97 fatal injuries [1]. Of these, 312 of the collisions 
occurred at level crossings with passive controls 
resulting in 39 fatal injuries. 
The cost associated with upgrading these 
crossings, however, raises questions as to 
whether active treatments are warranted 
(practicable) given the relatively small risk. 
This paper describes how an upgrade approach 
using low-cost warning devices can potentially 
provide a larger and earlier safety benefit for the 
population of level crossings with passive controls 
than using the current “standard” technology. In 
making a supporting argument for this approach, 
the question of how safe such warning devices 
need to be is posed, continuing the debate – how 
safe is safe enough in terms of risk acceptance. 
While an understanding of what is tolerable in 
terms of hazard rates is useful in the specification 
of safety requirements for such systems, the paper 
also discusses fail-safe design principles and how 
these need to be considered in the context of 
varying operating conditions and human factors 
and how they can influence safety. The discussion 
focuses in particular on the effect reliability 
performance has on the level crossing user. 
2 NOTATION 
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
ALCAM Australian Level Crossing 
Assessment Model 
ARO Accredited Railway Operator 
HSE Health and Safety Executive, 
United Kingdom 
LCLCWD Low-cost Level Crossing Warning 
Device (assumes compliance with 
AS1742.7 [3] in relation to road 
signals e.g. RX5 light assemblies) 
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MTBF Mean Time Between Failure 
MTTR Mean Time To Restoration 
RAMS Reliability, Availability, 
Maintainability and Safety 
RISSB Railway Industry Safety and 
Standards Board, Australia 
RSSB Railway Safety and Standards 
Board, United Kingdom 
SFAIRP So Far As Is Reasonably 
Practicable 
SIL Safety Integrity Level 
THR Tolerable Hazard Rate 
 
3 LOW COST RAILWAY LEVEL CROSSINGS 
The Australian railway industry has been 
investigating low-cost railway level crossing 
warning devices (LCLCWDs) for several years as 
a possible control for the improvement of safety at 
low-exposure regional crossings across the 
network. 
To eliminate the risk associated with the use of a 
different interface to the road crossing user, 
LCLCWDs will use the standard AS1742.7 [3] RX5 
flashing light assembly road user interface so that 
from a road crossing user perspective, it will look 
like a standard configuration – i.e. nothing to 
differentiate LCLCWDs from conventional warning 
control devices. The key difference between 
LCLCWDs and conventional warning devices are 
the technologies used for power supply, train 
detection, connectivity and control. LCLCWDs are 
characterized by the use of technologies that 
reduce equipment, installation, maintenance and 
operating costs, and are often associated with 
lower levels of safety integrity [4].  
Assuming LCLCWDs have a total cost of 
ownership that is approximately say 25% of the 
current “standard” technology, then an argument 
supporting the upgrading of a cross-section of 
passive (low-exposure) crossings with LCLCWDs 
is possible as more crossings can be treated for 
the same outlay; there is the potential for a 
significantly larger and earlier safety benefit for the 
population of crossings compared with an 
incremental upgrade approach using conventional 
warning devices, even allowing for a lower level of 
safety integrity for the LCLCWD [5]. 
One of the principles behind LCLCWDs is the 
utilization of devices with a level of safety integrity 
for safety-related functions (i.e. warn road user of 
approaching train) that is commensurate to the 
level of risk reduction required to meet the 
tolerable hazard rate (THR) for the hazard 
(collision between road vehicle and rail vehicle). 
As low-exposure crossings have a low risk, the 
magnitude of the risk reduction to sufficiently 
reduce the risk is less when compared to the 
magnitude of the risk reduction required for higher 
risk crossings. 
Railway signalling technology existed long before 
the concept of safety integrity levels. Railway 
signalling has long been based on the fail-safe 
principle; and as such there is a tacit perception 
that all railway signalling technology is SIL4 (the 
highest safety level) because it is “fail-safe”. It is 
not the intention of this paper to debate the 
veracity of this perception. 
The practice of requiring all railway-signalling 
equipment including railway level crossing warning 
devices to have a SIL4 rating (dangerous failure 
rate < 1E-8 / hour) for safety-related functions 
effectively creates a distortion in safety spending 
for sites where this level of risk reduction is an 
over-kill (no pun intended). A significant 
component of the cost of level crossing warning 
devices is influenced by safety integrity 
requirements; higher levels of safety integrity 
require more demanding development processes 
than lower levels and this is very much reflected in 
the relative development costs. 
The following section poses the question, “how 
safe is safe enough?” and discusses the process 
of determining safety requirements for LCLCWDs 
based on European practice.  
4 HOW SAFE IS SAFE ENOUGH? 
The decision-making process for making safety-
related decisions (i.e. deployment of LCLCWDs) 
would typically consider whether a risk control 
measure is legally required, and if not, whether the 
decision makes business or commercial sense. 
Consideration of the risk to individuals is typically 
part of the decision making process, prioritizing the 
risks that are evaluated for further risk reduction. 
4.1 Legal Duty 
Under Australian national rail safety legislation, 
railways are required to manage risk "so far as is 
reasonably practicable" (SFAIRP). The legislation 
states [6]: 
 “46—Management of risks  
A duty imposed on a person under this 
Law to ensure, so far as is reasonably 
practicable, safety requires the person— 
(a) to eliminate risks to safety so far as is 
reasonably practicable; and 
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(b) if it is not reasonably practicable to 
eliminate risks to safety, to minimise those 
risks so far as is reasonably practicable.” 
In determining what is reasonably practicable, the 
national rail safety legislation states [6]: 
“47—Meaning of reasonably practicable 
In this Part— 
reasonably practicable, in relation to a 
duty to ensure safety, means that which is 
(or was at a particular time) reasonably 
able to be done in relation to ensuring 
safety, taking into account and weighing 
up all relevant matters, including— 
(a) the likelihood of the hazard or the risk 
concerned occurring; and 
(b) the degree of harm that might result 
from the hazard or the risk; and 
(c) what the person concerned knows, or 
ought reasonably to know, about— 
(i) the hazard or the risk; and 
(ii) ways of eliminating or 
minimising the risk; and 
(d) the availability and suitability of ways to 
eliminate or minimise the risk; and 
(e) after assessing the extent of the risk 
and the available ways of eliminating or 
minimising the risk—the cost associated 
with available ways of eliminating or 
minimising the risk (including whether the 
cost is grossly disproportionate to the 
risk).” 
SFAIRP is defined in law and is assessed by a 
Court after-the-fact. The problem for railways is 
that they have judge before the fact that they can 
demonstrate to a future Court that the risk is 
SFAIRP i.e. after the harm has occurred. 
4.2 Risk Tolerability 
From the railway perspective, level crossings 
contribute significantly to the level of risk; however, 
from the road perspective, level crossings are 
considered to be of low if not insignificant risk due 
to the relatively low number of fatalities and 
injuries that occur at level crossings compared with 
those that occur on the road. From a societal 
perspective, it can be argued that compared to all 
causes of accidental death or injury, those that 
occur at railway level crossings are not significant 
[7]. While not related to the legal duty to ensure 
safety of the railway SFAIRP, the public perception 
of risk at level crossings and tolerability of high 
consequence occurrences with multiple fatalities 
needs to be taken into consideration (often termed 
societal risk tolerability). This poses the question: 
does society expect that it is practicable to 
eliminate level crossing collisions? 
Events such as the collision between a truck and 
passenger train near Kerang in 2007 [8], resulting 
in 11 fatalities and 14 injuries, have the potential to 
drive policy changes that commit resources for 
prevention of future occurrences significantly 
exceeding what is economically reasonable 
(practicable) given the risk [9]. 
Individual risk tolerability also needs to be taken 
into consideration even though it is not directly 
related to the legal duty. In order to determine 
tolerability of a risk, the railway needs to have an 
understanding of what is acceptable and what is 
unacceptable [10].  
In Australia there is no guidance as to the 
acceptable level of residual risk for level crossings, 
neither is there guidance on establishing limits of 
tolerability. It is left up to individual railway 
operators to define risk acceptance criteria. 
The HSE in the United Kingdom provides general 
guidance on individual risk tolerability with a 
conceptual tolerability of risk framework setting 
boundaries between broadly acceptable and 
unacceptable risk [11].  
In more recent guidance by the RSSB to the rail 
industry in the United Kingdom [12], it is noted that 
for risks approaching the unacceptable range, high 
priority should be given to the evaluation and 
development of options to reduce the risk, 
however only those that are reasonably practicable 
need to be implemented. The legal duty to reduce 
risk SFAIRP needs to be met irrespective of the 
level of risk incurred by exposed population 
groups. This appears to be consistent with the how 
the legal duty is interpreted in Australia. 
As there is no legal requirement in Australia to 
consider risk tolerability, it is likely that many 
railways will not have quantitative risk acceptance 
criteria for level crossings.  
Making an argument for the upgrade of a passive 
level crossing with a warning device will typically 
involve compliance with existing codes of practice 
and standards such as AS7658 [13] and AS1742.7 
[3]. However, upgrading with a LCLCWD would 
mean installing a warning device with a lower level 
of safety integrity than existing “standard” warning 
devices – a level commensurate to the required 
level of risk reduction.  
Therefore, an understanding of the limits of 
tolerability and where the current risk lies in 
relation to these limits is fundamental for 
determining what is an acceptable residual risk 
after treatment. 
An example is provided below for a population of 
level crossings with passive controls in 
Queensland, suitable for upgrade with LCLCWDs.  
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Assessing each passively controlled crossing 
individually will more often than not result in no 
further action as the SFAIRP obligation is likely to 
have been met in that the cost of additional risk 
control measures is sufficiently disproportionate to 
the safety benefit. For this reason, the crossing 
population risk needs to be considered. 
Nikandros in [14] suggests that the tolerability limit 
for a member of the general public of 1E-4 per 
year, as defined in guidance by the HSE in the 
United Kingdom, would seem reasonable for 
Australia based on Australian road fatality rates. 
A hypothetical upper limit of tolerability for users of 
all level crossings in Queensland (excluding 
pedestrians) of 1E-4 is therefore apportioned to 
public passive level crossings, such that the 
individual risk for road users at all public passive 
level crossings in Queensland is: 
1E-4 x 0.703 = 7.03E-5 
where 70.3% of public level crossings in 
Queensland are passive [15]. One could argue 
that the 29.7% of active crossings are high-risk 
crossings and as such the apportionment should 
be biased such that the population of the public 
passive crossings should have a smaller risk 
budget. However for simplicity, no bias has been 
applied. 
Using the lower bound of 1E-6 as a marker for 
acceptable risk, this apportioned value for road 
users at all passive level crossings in Queensland 
is: 
1E-6 x 0.703 = 7.03E-7 
The table below illustrates a crude analysis of 
current safety losses at passive level crossings in 
Queensland. Two sets of calculations were 
performed, one based on the number of registered 
vehicles in postal areas with passive level 
crossings, the other based on ALCAM survey data 
from a subset of passive level crossings whose 
traffic volumes had been surveyed. 
The figures in the table below indicate that the 
current risk is approximately an order of magnitude 
lower than the hypothetical upper limit of 
tolerability 7.03E-5, however above the acceptable 
risk marker of 7.03E-7. 
 
Number of public level 
crossings with passive 
controls 
1269 in 
Queensland [15] 
173 with 
ALCAM survey 
data 
Vehicles 1,075,871 
registered 
vehicles in postal 
areas with 
passive level 
crossings 
29,488 
surveyed traffic 
volumes 
Assumed vehicle 
occupancy 
1.1 
Assumed % of 
vehicles exposed to 
risk 
20% 100% 
Assumed % of 
vehicles exposed to 
risk that are regular 
users 
70% 
 
Individuals regularly 
exposed to risk 
165,684 22,705 
Estimated annual 
collisions at all public 
passive LXs  
 
6.3834 
(proportion of collisions that 
occurred from 2000-2009 at 
passive LXs 35.7% [1] x 161 
collisions in QLD from 2001-2009 
[16]) / 9 years 
Estimated fatalities per 
collision at all public 
passive level 
crossings in Australia 
[1] 
0.1411 
Estimated annual 
fatalities (no figures 
were available for 
injuries)  
0.9007 (for 
population of 
passive 
crossings) 
(6.3834 x 
0.1411) 
0.1228 (for 
proportion of 
fatalities at 
surveyed 
passive 
crossings) 
(173 x 0.9007) 
/ 1269 
Individual risk for 
population of level 
crossings with 
passive controls in 
Queensland (annual 
fatalities / individuals 
regularly exposed) 
5.4363E-6 5.4085E-6 
 
4.3 Determining Tolerable Hazard Rates 
Whilst there are standards for safety-related 
technology such as CENELEC EN50126 [17], 
EN50128 [18] [19], EN50129 [20] and IEC 61508 
[21], their application is predicated on the amount 
of risk reduction that is desired. That desire 
depends on risk appetite and the ability to 
successfully argue that the risk has been reduced 
SFAIRP in a future Court. The standards do allow 
for risk treatments of varying effectiveness. 
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However, deciding which treatment/s to use 
depends on what one accepts as the residual risk. 
A high-level description of the European approach 
to risk apportionment based on EN50126-2 [19] is 
described below (and illustrated in Figure 1).  
 
Safety integrity
Safety requirements
Risk Assessment
Hazard, THR
Hazard Control
Railway's 
Responsibility
Supplier's 
Responsibility
System Hazard Level
Functional Level
Subsystem A
Safety integrity
Failure rates
Maintenance
Procedures
Constituent Level
System definition
Hazard identification
Consequence analysis
Risk tolerability 
THR allocation
 
Figure 1. Typical safety requirement allocation 
process [19]   
 
The railway is generally responsible for defining 
system level hazards and corresponding tolerable 
hazard rates (THRs). One approach described by 
EN50126-2 [19] involves the derivation of THRs by 
comparing the performance of existing systems, 
taking into account risk tolerability criteria. It is 
further noted that this can be facilitated either by 
analytical or statistical methods or from using 
qualitative approaches. 
For example, the residual risk of level crossings 
with active warning systems in Queensland could 
be considered in the derivation of a THR for the 
hazard (collision between road vehicle and rail 
vehicle). This would mean that the magnitude of 
risk reduction required to meet the THR at a low-
exposure passive level crossing would be less 
than at higher risk crossings, supporting the 
argument for LCLCWDs with a level of safety 
integrity commensurate to the required level of risk 
reduction to meet the THR.  
Safety integrity relates to how often a safety-
related system implementing a safety function can 
enter into an unsafe state that can lead to system 
level hazards, such that the hazard rate does not 
exceed the THR defined for the system level 
hazard. Safety integrity can be expressed as one 
of four discrete levels, SILs, where the apportioned 
THR falls within a range associated with a given 
level [19]. SILs are allocated to safety-related 
functions and consequently the subsystems 
implementing these functions. While random 
failures can be quantified using probabilistic 
calculations, this is not possible for systematic 
failures, and therefore each safety integrity level is 
associated with a group of methods and tools used 
to provide the stated level of confidence [20].  
The SIL concept is commonly misused, especially 
for signalling equipment including level crossing 
warning devices. EN50126-2 [19] mentions several 
misuses including the use of SILs for marketing 
purposes, describing SILs as system attributes 
e.g. “a SIL4 level crossing warning system”, and 
derivation of THRs from SILs. Safety integrity 
requirements should be determined through the 
use of THRs as described above. 
5 FAIL-SAFE DESIGN PRINCIPLES 
Level crossing warning devices are designed with 
fail-safe principles [20], such that when a failure 
affecting the safety function is detected, the device 
enters or remains in a pre-defined safe state.  
Failures of a system implementing the safety 
function (warn level crossing user of approaching 
train) can either be dangerous failures or safe 
failures, depending on the system state resulting 
from the failure. A dangerous failure is defined by 
IEC61508-4 [22] in continuous mode as a failure 
that: 
“…causes a safety function to fail such 
that the EUC [Equipment Under control] is 
put into a hazardous or potentially 
hazardous state; or decreases the 
probability that the safety function 
operates correctly when required”  
An example of this type of failure is the undetected 
failure of the train detection function on the 
approach to a level crossing (e.g. approach track 
circuit fails wrong-side). 
A safe failure on the other hand is defined by 
IEC61508-4 [21] as a failure that: 
“results in the spurious operation of the 
safety function to put the EUC [Equipment 
Under Control] (or part thereof) into a safe 
state or maintain a safe state; or increases 
the probability of the spurious operation of 
the safety function to put the EUC (or part 
thereof) into a safe state or maintain a 
safe state” 
Safety integrity relates to the ability of a system to 
carry out the safety function(s) such that the higher 
the level of safety integrity, the lower the 
probability of a safety-related system failure 
affecting the safety function(s) or its ability to enter 
a safe failure mode [21]. The proportion of 
detectable dangerous failures to total dangerous 
failures by automatic on-line diagnostic tests is 
referred to as the diagnostic coverage of the 
system [21]. A high level of safety integrity alone 
does not imply a high level of reliability or 
availability. These are separate considerations that 
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need to be taken into account in terms of a how a 
system’s reliability or availability may impact 
safety. 
Safe failures, while technically safe when 
considered within the system boundary, can 
potentially impact the effectiveness of the control 
to reduce risk. How these “safe” failure modes 
affect safety (effective level of risk reduction in 
terms of hazard rate) when considered at the 
larger socio-technical system level depends largely 
on the operational and procedural context of the 
control.  
CENELEC standard EN50126-2 [19] provides 
high-level guidance on designing fail-safe systems 
and details possible states in response to a failure 
(guidance on fail-safe design of electronic safety-
related systems is given in EN50129 [20]). Of 
particular interest to this discussion is the “system 
locked in a safe (restrictive) state”, for which the 
guidance states that effectiveness of the system 
“lock-up” needs to be verified and a justification 
made that the state will not be cancelled due to 
additional failures. 
It is further noted that: 
“For justifying fail-safety at a system level, 
in addition to defining the system’s safe 
state, the overall railway system should 
also be analysed as the resultant 
degraded modes may give rise to other 
hazards” 
Whether lock-up mode is inherent to the system or 
procedural, assurance needs to be made that 
further failures do not lead to unsafe states that 
are unacceptable to the safety requirements of the 
system. Consideration to this should not only be 
for further technical failures, but also human errors 
that could lead to additional hazards. 
The safe state of existing Australian level crossing 
warning devices is the activation of the flashing 
lights and closure of the boom barriers (for level 
crossings with boom barriers). Of particular 
concern is compliance of the level crossing user. 
The road code - Queensland Transport Operations 
(Road Use Management—Road Rules) Regulation 
2009 [23] specifically states in this case: 
“A driver must not enter a level crossing if— 
(a) warning lights (for example, twin red 
lights or rotating red lights) are 
operating or warning bells are ringing; 
or 
(b) a gate, boom or barrier at the crossing 
is closed or is opening or closing; or  
(c) … 
Maximum penalty – 20 penalty units.” 
It is unlikely and unreasonable to expect level 
crossing users to wait indefinitely. This safe state 
therefore needs further consideration. The 
following section discusses human factors 
considerations of warning device failure modes. 
6 HUMAN FACTORS CONSIDERATIONS OF 
WARNING DEVICE FAILURE MODES  
While the safety integrity of technology performing 
safety-related functions is fundamental to ensuring 
safety, it is only part of the picture of a complex 
socio-technical system such as a level crossing 
warning system that has interfaces with other 
technical systems, and “non technical” systems 
e.g. level crossing users, train drivers, track 
workers, etc. 
The performance of a warning system, its failure 
modes and its ability to clearly communicate its 
state to users of a level crossing can potentially 
condition their behaviour, resulting in an increase 
of errors or increases in non-compliant behaviour. 
This inturn can lead to an increase in the hazard 
(collision between road vehicle and rail vehicle) 
rate and thus reduce the level of risk reduction 
provided by the control. 
There is often little consideration for how system 
performance outside the system boundary and at 
the interfaces with “non-technical” systems (i.e. 
humans) can affect overall safety performance. 
Consideration of human factors in RAMS of a 
railway application is however prescribed by the 
CENELEC standard EN50126-1 [17]: 
"Humans shall be considered as 
possessing the ability to contribute to the 
RAMS of a railway system. To achieve this 
aim, the manner in which human factors 
can influence railway RAMS should be 
identified and managed throughout the 
entire lifecycle. The analysis should 
include the potential impact of human 
factors of railway RAMS within the design 
and development phases of the system." 
And is additionally prescribed by the Australian 
Rail Safety National Law Regulations [24]: 
“17—Human factors 
Procedures to ensure that human factor 
matters are taken into account during the 
development, operation and maintenance 
of the safety management system and for 
the integration of human factors principles 
and knowledge into all relevant aspects of 
operational and business systems.” 
The following subsections discuss the effect of 
human factors on safety in relation to level 
crossing warning device failure modes. 
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6.1 Operational and Procedural Context 
In a typical Australian regional scenario, an 
autonomous level crossing warning device with no 
rail-side healthy-state indication or level crossing 
approach signal is assumed. The remote 
monitoring system would be the timeliest source of 
failure information, communicating the failure state 
directly to the train control room via GSM. The 
maintenance response time would be typically less 
than 24 hours, however, in some very remote 
locations and in the case of multiple system 
failures in succession (e.g. due to severe weather 
conditions) this could be longer. 
According to a draft version of the national code of 
practice for Australian Network Rules and 
Procedures (ANRP) being developed by RISSB 
[25], if an active level crossing is faulty or 
potentially faulty, network control officers must 
warn rail traffic crews. This communication would 
presumably occur via radio. 
The rail traffic crew is required to approach the 
faulty level crossing at a speed that allows them to 
stop the rail vehicle short of the crossing for a 
suspected fault or confirmed fault where the 
crossing is unprotected, or protected by 
emergency services or road traffic controllers. The 
rail vehicle can proceed only if it is safe to do so. In 
the situation that a competent rail worker is 
protecting the crossing, the rail vehicle can 
proceed after the worker provides authorization to 
the rail traffic crew. 
In the time that failure occurs to the time that the 
level crossing is protected for corrective 
maintenance and restored to a nominal operating 
state, level crossing users are exposed to a 
prolonged failure mode. Once level crossing users 
determine that no train is approaching, it is likely 
they will traverse the crossing after waiting for a 
period of time, driving around half-boom barriers 
(where applicable).  
6.2 Human Performance 
This section discusses human performance in 
relation to the level crossing user, the network 
control officer, the rail traffic crew and workers at 
the crossing; however, the discussion is limited to 
issues relating to reliability of the warning device. 
Consider a level crossing warning device that is in 
one of the pre-defined safe failure states (flashing 
lights and lowering of boom barriers). The failure 
mode of Australian level crossings is 
indistinguishable from the train approach warning 
and does not provide feedback to the user as to 
the state of the system. When a level crossing 
user is first exposed, they are likely to assume that 
a train is approaching and wait. After the level 
crossing user realizes that no train is approaching, 
they find themselves in an unfamiliar situation and 
are unclear on what actions they should take. 
Inevitably, the level crossing user will traverse the 
crossing while the warning is active, which strictly 
speaking is non-compliant behaviour (non-
compliant with road rules). On roads in regional 
areas on Australia, it is not uncommon to have 
level crossings on the only access road (i.e. no 
alternate routes in the case of a failure). 
Factors such as poor sighting distance and bad 
weather (fog, rain, poor visibility) can compound 
the situation, significantly increasing the risk if 
trains are not stopped as a result of the failure. 
A regular user may encounter the same level 
crossing failure several times in succession if it is a 
prolonged failure or on occasion if it is an 
intermittent failure. Frequent exposure to failure 
can condition the level crossing user to loose 
confidence in the warning, potentially affecting 
their performance at other level crossings as well. 
This is one of the hypotheses of a level crossing 
accident that occurred at Rungoo in 2008 [26], 
where the truck driver involved in the accident was 
exposed to a level crossing in a state of failure 
(continuous ringing) prior to the accident. It was 
noted by investigators that the driver’s limited 
confidence that the warning indicated that a train 
was approaching might have contributed to the 
accident. 
Intermittent safe failures (false alarms) have been 
found to influence the rate of non-compliance at 
level crossings [27]. In an observational study 
where 50% of warnings at one of the level 
crossings observed were false alarms [28],  a high 
rate of non-compliance was observed compared 
with crossings with no false alarms. A simulator 
study conducted for the US Federal Railroad 
Administration [29] also concluded that motorists 
were sensitive to the reliability of the warning 
devices and were more likely to comply to signals 
when they perceived the warning to be reliable. 
Performance shaping factors such as a level 
crossing user’s expectation of when trains run (i.e. 
known schedules – especially for low rail traffic 
lines) are also expected to affect compliance. 
Coupled with exposure to failures, the level 
crossing user may create mental models of when 
the level crossing warning is credible, resulting in a 
mismatch between real risk and perceived risk, 
particularly when unscheduled trains are running.  
Failure states where the warning device appears 
to operate correctly (i.e. warning was activated for 
an approaching train) have an even greater 
potential to mislead level crossing users. Failures 
such as tail ringing (failure to extinguish warning 
once a train has passed the crossing clearance 
point) can help create the false perception that it is 
safe to traverse the level crossing once the train 
has cleared the crossing. This becomes 
particularly dangerous when the extended delay is 
due to a second train instead of the warning. As 
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these types of failures directly influence level 
crossing user behaviour, they are more likely to be 
addressed in the warning device safety case. 
From the perspective of stopping trains, the 
network control officer would have to receive an 
indication that a level crossing has failed or is not 
performing correctly. Depending on the coverage 
of remote monitoring system, some performance 
issues and types of intermittent failures may rely 
on analysis of logs or on-site inspections. 
In evaluating the reliability of the procedure for 
stopping trains when a failure is detected, there 
are significant human performance issues and 
error producing conditions to be considered in how 
the network control officer becomes aware of the 
failure through a human machine interface 
(workstation in control room), the subsequent 
communications between the network control 
officer and the rail traffic crew, and the 
performance of the crew themselves.  
An example of a few error producing conditions 
(identified in the Railway Action Reliability 
Assessment human reliability assessment method 
[30]) that can affect task performance are given 
below (non-exhaustive): 
• The need to transfer specific knowledge 
from task to task without loss: A network 
control officer provides instructions to rail 
traffic crew in relation to level crossings 
that have a suspected failure. The train 
might be a significant distance from the 
suspected crossing(s), requiring the use of 
long-term memory; 
• An impoverished quality of information 
conveyed by person/person interaction: 
Verbal communication (via radio) is used 
to inform rail traffic crew of level crossings 
that have a suspected fault. Information is 
complex and not well suited to verbal 
communication (i.e. codes, level crossing 
locations, etc.); and 
• Low signal to noise ratio: Alarm flooding in 
the control room, especially in the case of 
lightning or whether events that can cause 
large numbers of simultaneous failures. 
While warning device reliability and it effects on 
level crossing user performance has been 
discussed, in come contexts, the nominal 
operating performance of a warning device can 
also effect level crossing user performance.  
For warning devices without a constant warning 
time function (i.e. provides constant warning time 
for approaching trains, irrespective of the train 
approach speed), the variation in warning time 
between different types of trains can be significant 
and influence level crossing user performance. 
For example, if the majority of rail traffic consists of 
passenger trains, level crossing users might form 
mental models around the expected warning time. 
The warning time for the odd freight train operating 
at lower speeds could be significantly longer, 
resulting in a potential increase of non-complaint 
behaviour for longer warning times [27]. 
6.3 Determining Effective Level of Risk 
Reduction 
While risk reduction can often be estimated using 
statistical models and operational data collected by 
railways, this is not always possible for the 
introduction of new technology or where 
performance (e.g. operating modes, reliability, 
availability, etc.) of a technology differs with 
respect to the reference technology on which such 
calculations are based. 
In these cases, risk assessment using techniques 
such as event tree analysis and human reliability 
assessment, can provide an indication of where 
there are issues that need to be addressed. RSSB 
guidance on understanding human factors [31] 
reviews several techniques for evaluating human 
performance in the rail industry. 
The amount of additional risk, in terms of system 
hazard (collision between road vehicle and rail 
vehicle) and additional hazards, can theoretically 
be calculated by summing the estimated additional 
risk for each failure mode from an analysis such as 
failure mode effect and criticality analysis 
(FMECA). Each failure mode with a quantified 
failure rate would be the initiating event for an 
event tree including probabilities for remote 
monitoring failure, human error probabilities for 
each task involved in ensuring level crossing is 
protected or trains are stopped and for human 
error probabilities related to users of the level 
crossing.  
Where real-world data (task observation, incident 
data, simulation) is available, this should be used 
in preference to human reliability assessment.  
There is limited evidence in the literature on the 
relationship between warning device reliability 
(MTBF), MTTR and how these affect level crossing 
user performance (error and non-compliance). 
The CRC for Rail Innovation is investigating 
human performance of road users following 
exposure to prolonged and intermittent right-side 
failures at level crossings using driving simulation 
[32]. The aim of this research is to determine how 
these types of failure can condition road users and 
result in increased errors and non-compliance. The 
research also aims to discover whether road users’ 
performance recovers once the warning system is 
restored to the nominal operating state. Data 
obtained from this research will be useful in 
informing the quantification of relationships 
between key parameters such as MTBF, MTTR 
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and the probability of road users making errors or 
engaging in non-compliant behaviour. 
The driving simulator is a facility with a vehicle 
operating on a motion platform that provides six 
degrees of freedom immersed in a 180° virtual 3D 
environment. The use of a driving simulator offers 
a number of advantages including the provision of 
a safe and economical means of experimenting 
and facilitation of research that would otherwise 
not be possible due to ethical and safety issues. 
In the absence of real-world data, human reliability 
assessment can be performed and involves 
performing a task analysis, identifying the errors 
that can arise in performing the task, development 
of a risk model for the task (typically a fault tree) 
and quantification of the model using human error 
probabilities. For railway procedures for example, 
human error probabilities can be quantified using a 
technique such as the RSSB Railway Action 
Reliability Assessment [30]. 
Sensitivity analysis methods such as Monte-Carlo 
simulation can be applied to provide a range of 
values taking into account variability of human 
performance in addition to technical failures. 
6.4 Setting Appropriate Reliability Targets 
This paper has discussed how reliability of level 
crossing warning devices can become a safety-
related consideration, especially where human 
interfaces and procedures can give rise to hazards 
– both the system-level hazard (collision between 
road vehicle and rail vehicle) and additional 
hazards. 
The human factors context is the least portable 
part of a safety argument and needs to be 
considered for the specific installation, procedural 
and operational context. In the case of LCLCWDs, 
such devices would be destined for installation at 
low population / low-exposure sites, typically rural 
areas of Australia where the response time and 
MTTR are likely to be longer.  
By specifying reliability targets based on a specific 
deployment context, railways would be able to 
determine whether LCLCWDs that would 
otherwise meet safety requirements, would also 
meet the effective level of risk reduction required 
to meet the THRs associated with system-level 
hazards.  
7 CONCLUSION 
This paper introduced an argument for a level 
crossing upgrade approach using LCLCWDs. This 
approach can potentially provide a larger and 
earlier safety benefit than an incremental upgrade 
approach with existing “standard” warning devices 
for a population of passive level crossings, as 
more upgrades can be performed for the same 
budget.  
Part of the cost reduction, however, is a result of 
the device being developed to a lower level of 
safety integrity. The paper continued the debate as 
to how safe is safe enough, discussing issues of 
risk tolerability and how THRs could be determined 
to support the SIL apportionment process.  
Human factors considerations of warning devices 
and their interfaces between other technical 
systems and non-technical systems (e.g. level 
crossing users, train drivers, train controllers, etc.) 
were discussed in the context of fail-safe design 
principles and the pre-defined safe failure states of 
existing “standard” warning devices.  
The paper challenged the validity of assumptions 
underpinning safe failure states and discussed a 
high-level methodology for determining the 
effective level of risk reduction of warning device, 
taking into account human factors issues that can 
give rise to the system-level hazard (collision 
between rail vehicle and road vehicle) and 
additional hazards.  
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